Line types which do not use the argument field used to warn and ignore
a non-empty field. Treat that as invalid configuration instead, so typos
are not silently accepted.
Follow-up for: 614cc34f3a
test-bpf-restrict-fs.c creates a Manager with RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM, which
tries to set up the real system runtime directory hierarchy (e.g. create
/run/systemd/), and that requires privileges the test process may not
have (e.g. unprivileged sandboxed builders such as OBS).
Previously this was masked because bpf_restrict_fs_supported() did a
trial open/load/attach of the BPF program itself, which also requires
elevated privileges and so failed first, causing the test to skip
before ever reaching manager_new()/manager_startup(). Since
bpf_restrict_fs_supported() no longer does that trial load, the test
now reaches manager_new()/manager_startup() in these unprivileged
environments and hard-fails instead of skipping, e.g.:
Assertion failed: Expected "manager_startup(m, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)"
to succeed, but got error: -13/EACCES
Use the same manager_errno_skip_test() pattern already used by other
tests (test-engine.c, test-execute.c, test-path.c, ...) to skip
gracefully when manager_new() or manager_startup() fail due to missing
privileges, instead of asserting.
Follow-up for c99678eeda.
audit_log_user_comm_message from libaudit 4.2 rejects comm arguments
that exceed the kernel's comm limit of 15 characters with EINVAL. The
hard-coded "systemd-update-utmp" exceeds this by 4 characters. Shorten
it to "update-utmp" instead.
Accept -n as a short option for --dry-run in bootctl,
systemd-oomd, systemd-sysusers, and systemd-tmpfiles.
For systemd-repart, make -n equivalent to --dry-run=yes,
while keeping --dry-run=BOOL available.
Follow-up for: 2479f0bb09
Add unit coverage for config_parse_device_allow().
Verify valid device paths and subsystem patterns, invalid
specifiers and rights, default permissions, and reset handling.
Follow-up for: 20d52ab60e
The `Domains=` option in the `[Network]` section did not document its
behaviour when specified repeatedly. In practice the option is additive
(each occurrence accumulates search/routing domains) and assigning an
empty string resets the list, matching the closely related `DNS=`
option. This is implemented by `config_parse_domains()` in
`src/network/networkd-dns.c`, which frees both the search and route
domain sets on an empty `rvalue` and otherwise inserts each
whitespace-separated entry into the corresponding set.
Document this explicitly, using the same wording already used for
`DNS=` in the same man page, so users know repeated assignments are
combined and that an empty value clears them.
Fixes#38740.
bpf_restrict_fs_setup() is always called right after a successful
bpf_restrict_fs_supported(true) probe (see manager_setup() in
manager.c). Previously the probe independently opened, sized and
kernel-verifier-loaded the BPF object via prepare_restrict_fs_bpf(),
then did a trial LSM attach/detach via bpf_can_link_lsm_program() to
confirm the program *could* attach, and threw the whole object away
-- only for bpf_restrict_fs_setup() to build and verifier-load an
identical one from scratch again for the real, permanent attach.
The trial attach in the probe is redundant: if BPF_LSM_MAC attach
isn't actually usable (e.g. no BPF trampoline support on the running
architecture/kernel), bpf_restrict_fs_setup()'s own
sym_bpf_program__attach_lsm() call will simply fail, and that failure
is already logged and handled gracefully by its caller in manager.c
(logged as a warning, systemd continues without RestrictFileSystems=
enforcement). So bpf_restrict_fs_supported() only needs to check
whether the BPF LSM hook is enabled in the kernel at all
(lsm_supported("bpf")); it doesn't need to open/load/attach the BPF
program itself. Drop that from the probe, so the program is opened,
sized and verified by the kernel exactly once per boot instead of
twice.
Since the probe no longer verifies that the LSM BPF program can
actually attach, test-bpf-restrict-fs.c can no longer rely on
bpf_restrict_fs_supported(true) alone to skip on kernels/architectures
where the hook is listed but the real attach fails (e.g. missing BPF
trampoline support). Have the test also check m->restrict_fs after
manager_startup() and skip if the program never got attached, instead
of proceeding to hard-fail the enforcement assertions.
- sysupdate: In the auto-enable service, don't enable all features
The auto-enable service should activate suggested components and
features but enabled all features which includes the default components
unsuggested features and any unsuggested features of the suggested
components. This is unexpected behavior and we rather want this service
to be limited to suggested features.
Switch the service flag to suggested and make the wording more explicit
in the man page. Also fix the wrong statement that it operates on
enabled components, it operates on all components, also explicitly
disabled ones.
- sysupdate: Change disabling with
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested
The disabling of features or components with the flag
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested didn't disable the suggested
ones but instead disabled all other ones. This is rather unintuitive due
to how the flags are named and also not really needed because the
intended reconciliation outcome can instead be done by first disabling
everything and then enabling the suggested ones again which is easier to
reason about. For components the tricky part is that they default to
enabled and thus it's better to have the disable/enable commands with
--component-suggested operate only on suggested ones instead of touching
others like "legacy" components that don't explicity say whether they
are enabled and suggested or not.
Make running disablement of components/features with
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested undo a previous enablement
with the same flags. Document how one can align the system to only use
suggested components/features and not anything else by doing it in two
steps, first disabling everything and then enabling suggested ones. This
also makes it clearer now that all components that are not explicitly
enabled nor suggested will be disabled then.
In Ubuntu, rsyslog is (a) part of the minimal image and (b) does not run
as root. To facilitate this, the rsyslog package configures /var/log
to be writeable by the syslog group.
There are currently conflicts in the Ubuntu packaging due to the way
tmpfiles are handled in package scripts: when systemd-tmpfiles is
invoked with both configurations (or for all configurations), things
work fine. But if invoked with only var.conf, which is the default case
for package upgrades, rsyslog is broken.
One suggestion to approach this was to make rsyslog's tmpfile
configuration use ACLs instead of trying to change the owning group and
directory mode. This can work, but since the ACL mask is stored in the
group permission bits, the effective mask for rsyslog becomes r-x again
when var.conf is invoked, because it sees that 0775 != 0755, and chmods
the directory.
Hence, for /var/log write permisssions to be extendable with ACLs,
the mode must be at least 0775. Rather than change the default,
add a build option to configure the /var/log mode.
The disabling of features or components with the flag
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested didn't disable the suggested
ones but instead disabled all other ones. This is rather unintuitive due
to how the flags are named and also not really needed because the
intended reconciliation outcome can instead be done by first disabling
everything and then enabling the suggested ones again which is easier to
reason about. For components the tricky part is that they default to
enabled and thus it's better to have the disable/enable commands with
--component-suggested operate only on suggested ones instead of touching
others like "legacy" components that don't explicity say whether they
are enabled and suggested or not.
Make running disablement of components/features with
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested undo a previous enablement
with the same flags. Document how one can align the system to only use
suggested components/features and not anything else by doing it in two
steps, first disabling everything and then enabling suggested ones. This
also makes it clearer now that all components that are not explicitly
enabled nor suggested will be disabled then.
NV indexes created in the storage hierarchy can be undefined and
redefined with TPM owner auth. Because of this, NvPCRs need some way
to prevent them from being redfined in a way that allows spoof
measurements to be replayed.
The current approach requires knowledge of a secret ("anchor secret")
in order to derive the initial NvPCR measurement and to derive a
measurement to an existing PCR (9). The credential is protected by the
TPM with a PCR policy. Without access to the credential, it's not
possible to replay measurements to a newly defined NvPCR without
breaking the binding with the measurement in PCR 9. However, this
approach has a couple of issues:
- The credential is currently only protected by PCR11. As it's not
protected by the rest of the boot chain, it's possible to boot other
operating systems in order to replay the PCR11 measurements and
recover the secret. Note that as the NvPCR anchoring happens in early
boot, the credential is stored in the ESP.
- Someone with privileged access to a system can just create a new
credential containing a known secret and store this in /var/lib and
the ESP. The NvPCRs are anchored with this known secret on subsequent
boots, and therefore the measurements can no longer be trusted.
Imagine the scenario where privileged access is theoretically possible
as a result of some vulnerability. After upgrading the system to fix
this vulnerability, the system should be able to attest that it is
now in a good state. However, if an adversary were able to use their
priviliges to replace the credential, they are able to obtain
persistence and the NvPCR measurements are no longer trustworthy.
This PR changes things to take a different approach. Instead of
requiring knowledge of a secret, the NvPCRs are now created in a way
that requires a policy to be satisfied for writing. The write policy has
2 branches:
- TPM2_PolicyNvWritten(true), which can be satisified without any
further authorization if the NvPCR has already been extended.
- TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(pcrPubKey, SHA256("nvpcr-init")) which can be
satisfied with a signed PCR policy, and must be used to perform the
initial extend to a NvPCR.
The intention here is that the signed PCR policy that can be used to
authorize the initial extend to the NvPCR can only be satisfied during
early boot. During later boot phases, this signed PCR policy must not be
valid. This means that if a NvPCR is undefined and redefined, it won't
be possible to satisfy its write policy in order to able to perform the
initial extend.
In order to anchor the NvPCRs and prevent them from being undefined and
then redefined with a different policy that does allow them to be
extended, the names of the NvPCRs are measured to PCR9. Verifiers must
check that the names of attested NvPCRs match the measurements in PCR9.
This uses the PCR signing key from the currently booted UKI to create
the NvPCRs. If this changes between boots, then tpm2-setup automatically
recreates new NvPCRs with an updated write policy to reflect this. I've
tried to be careful to not undefine arbitrary NV indexes in this case,
so it checks that the existing NV index looks like a NvPCR (ie, it has
the expected attributes) before undefining it.
I did originally try to preserve the old behaviour for existing systems,
but it makes things a lot more complicated. As the new implementation
already creates new NvPCRs when the PCR signing key changes, I ended up
just automatically upgrading the old NvPCRs as well. Again, I check here
that any existing NV index looks like an old style NvPCR (ie, it has the
expected attributes) before undefining it.
I did notice that the initial NvPCR measurement isn't going into the
log. I don't know if that was an intentional choice, but I've preserved
that behaviour in this PR.
This also adds a new option to ukify (--sign-initrd-pcrs) which creates
signed policies (one per PCR bank) that can only be satisfied from the
initrd. These policies are used for initializing the NvPCRs, but can also
be used for protecting TPM2 keyslots enrolled with systemd-cryptenroll
(by using the --tpm2-public-key-policyref=initrd option).
There is one outstanding issue. The NvPCR definitions support different
algorithms, but the use of PolicyAuthorize means that they can only support
SHA-256 for now. This is because the signed policy algorithm must match
the name algorithm, and some additional work is required to support
signed PCR policies for algorithms other than SHA256. I've left a note in
tpm2_nvpcr_initialize that details what's required, and I'll take a look
at that in a subsequent PR.
The auto-enable service should activate suggested components and
features but enabled all features which includes the default components
unsuggested features and any unsuggested features of the suggested
components. This is unexpected behavior and we rather want this service
to be limited to suggested features.
Switch the service flag to suggested and make the wording more explicit
in the man page. Also fix the wrong statement that it operates on
enabled components, it operates on all components, also explicitly
disabled ones.
x11_read_data() parses an 'Option "XkbVariant" ""' line in
00-keyboard.conf with strv_split_full(..., EXTRACT_UNQUOTE), which turns
the empty quoted value into a non-NULL empty string rather than NULL.
Since 812aa57d2c ("string-util: beef up string_is_safe()") an empty
string is rejected by string_is_safe() unless STRING_ALLOW_EMPTY is
passed, so x11_context_is_safe() now refuses such a context and
x11_context_verify() discards the whole thing. As a result "localectl
status" reports "X11 Layout: (unset)" even though the file names a valid
layout, and compositors reading org.freedesktop.locale1 (e.g. the SDDM
greeter) fall back to the us layout.
Introduce x11_context_normalize(), suggested by @lionheartyu, which
converts empty strings to NULL while freeing the heap allocation —
unlike x11_context_empty_to_null() which only NULLs the pointer without
freeing. Call it at the end of x11_read_data(), before
x11_context_verify(), so empty option values are treated as unset. This
also keeps x11_context_equal() comparisons consistent with the setter
path (method_set_x11_keyboard) and vconsole_read_data(), which both
store NULL for empty values.
Fixes#43007
The physical key between right Shift and right Ctrl (Brazilian ABNT2 ["/
? deg"]) emits scancode 0x4e (KEY_KPPLUS) at boot.
Remap the observed 0x4e keycode to KEY_RO so it produces the expected
characters with the Brazilian ABNT2 XKB layout.
The BMI260 accelerometer in the OneXPlayer Super X is exposed through
the ACPI BMI0160 ID. Its X and Y axes do not match the built-in display
axes, and no firmware mount matrix is provided.
Add an exact vendor and product DMI match with the matrix verified on
the hardware. The matrix keeps the native landscape position normal and
maps both portrait rotations to the corresponding display orientation.
Tested with iio-sensor-proxy 3.8 and Mutter 49.7 in all display
orientations. The compiled hwdb entry also matches the complete modalias
reported by the device.
Development of this patch used assistance from ChatGPT 5.6 sol.
Previously, probe_superblocks() forwarded blkid_do_fullprobe()'s and
blkid_do_safeprobe()'s raw return code on error, which is just -1 with
no errno attached. The caller passes this value straight to
log_device_debug_errno() with %m, so a generic probing failure always
printed strerror(-1) regardless of what actually went wrong.
Convert the -1 error case to a proper negative errno via
errno_or_else(), matching the pattern used elsewhere in this file. The
'nothing found' (1) and success (0) return values are unchanged.
get_sub_mounts() clones each submount of the given prefix with
OPEN_TREE_CLONE. The kernel resolves the path of an OPEN_TREE_CLONE
with LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, i.e. if the submount is an autofs automount
point that has not been triggered yet, cloning it forces the automount
to trigger, and open_tree() blocks until the automount request has
been served.
This is particularly problematic during boot: setting up a private
/proc for the first sandboxed service (e.g. systemd-userdbd.service,
which uses ProtectProc=invisible) clones the submounts of /proc, which
include PID 1's own /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc automount point. The
executor then blocks until PID 1 gets around to dispatching the
resulting proc-sys-fs-binfmt_misc.mount job, which competes with the
ongoing boot transaction. On a Fedora 44 VM this delayed
systemd-userdbd.service by ~0.9s, and with it every early-boot NSS
user/group lookup that ends up in nss-systemd's varlink queries — most
importantly systemd-tmpfiles-setup-dev-early.service, which
systemd-udevd.service is ordered after, stalling the whole boot
critical path:
[2.131846] proc-sys-fs-binfmt_misc.automount: Got automount request
for /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc, triggered by 323 ((systemd-userd))
[2.943574] Mounting proc-sys-fs-binfmt_misc.mount...
[2.968507] Mounted proc-sys-fs-binfmt_misc.mount.
Triggering the automount here also defeats its purpose, since
binfmt_misc ends up mounted on every boot even if nothing ever
accesses it.
Pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT so that untriggered automount points are cloned
as they are instead.
Before (Fedora 44 VM, 4 vCPUs):
Startup finished in ... + 2.559s (userspace)
1.058s systemd-tmpfiles-setup-dev-early.service
938ms systemd-userdbd.service
After:
Startup finished in ... + 1.582s (userspace)
137ms systemd-tmpfiles-setup-dev-early.service
22ms systemd-userdbd.service
Fixes the following failure on Fedora 44:
```
TEST-58-REPART.sh[932]: Executing mkfs command: /usr/bin/mkfs.erofs -U 45745a56-aa2f-4619-8ca7-9cb63667c2ae -zlz4hc,level=3 /dev/loop0 /var/tmp/.#reparteb739e8b8cae7b70
TEST-58-REPART.sh[932]: Successfully forked off '(mkfs)' as PID 933.
TEST-58-REPART.sh[933]: ==933==ASan runtime does not come first in initial library list; you should either link runtime to your application or manually preload it with LD_PRELOAD.
TEST-58-REPART.sh[932]: '(mkfs)' failed with exit status 1.
```
Move the bind mount retry path into a small helper so
apply_one_mount() no longer carries destination creation and
retry state inline.
Report destination creation and retry failures at debug level,
then return the error to apply_mounts(). The caller still reports
the final mount namespace failure with the cleaned-up mount path.
env-file-label.[ch] was removed by 3e5320e27d
("env-file: port write_env_file() to label_ops_pre()"), which
replaced write_env_file_label() with WRITE_ENV_FILE_LABEL.
0dc39dffbd ("Use paths specified from environment variables for
/etc configuration files") later reintroduced only
src/shared/env-file-label.c. The header and meson entry were not
restored, no callers use write_env_file_label() or
write_vconsole_conf_label(), and the current write_env_file()
signature no longer matches the stale wrapper.
Remove the unbuilt source file again.
Removed by: 3e5320e27d
Reintroduced by: 0dc39dffbd
Follow-up for: 0dc39dffbd
--component-all is documented to include the default component-less
installation. Do not drop it merely because the context operates on a
root/image, or because all its transfers are currently disabled by
features.
This lets --component-all --feature-all enable-feature write the
default component feature drop-ins instead of succeeding with no
components selected.
TEST-72-SYSUPDATE covers both all transfers disabled by features and
the same default component feature operation under --root=.
Repro: create a default feata.feature plus a transfer gated by feata,
then run:
build/systemd-sysupdate --root="$root" --component-all --feature-all enable-feature
Before: no drop-in was written.
Follow-up for: 4481661a75
When recording installdb entries under --root=, keep the leading slash
after stripping the root. Compare current transfer target paths in the
same root-relative form during cleanup.
This prevents cleanup from treating still-owned resources below --root=
as orphaned.
TEST-72-SYSUPDATE covers --root= cleanup keeping a still-owned file and
its matching installdb entry.
Repro: create a rooted transfer for /target/foo-@v.bin, add a
matching installdb entry for /target/./foo-@v.bin, then run:
build/systemd-sysupdate --root="$root" --verify=no cleanup
Before: foo-1.bin and the installdb entry were removed.
Follow-up for: d82e256bb9
Repeats the enable/disable specifier-expansion check with 'systemctl
preset' instead. preset-all is intentionally not exercised here, since
$root accumulates unit files from earlier sections that are
deliberately invalid, and preset-all would trip on those unrelated
units.
Definitions enumerated under --root= are already rooted. Passing those
paths to the config parsers with the same root prefixes the root again,
so feature and transfer files are parsed from the wrong path.
Repro: create root/etc/sysupdate.d/rootfeat.feature and
01-root.transfer, then run:
build/systemd-sysupdate --root="$root" --verify=no --offline features rootfeat
Before: parsing failed at line 1 with a bogus Source Type= error.
Fixes#42783.
Follow-up for: e1384cfb09
tpm2-measure-nvpcr=no and invalid NvPCR names only affect the current
comma-separated option. They returned from parse_options(), so later
options were silently skipped.
Repro:
build/systemd-veritysetup attach testvol /dev/null /no/such \
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \
tpm2-measure-nvpcr=no,root-hash-signature=relative
Before: root-hash-signature=relative was skipped, and execution continued
to the missing block-device error.
After: root-hash-signature=relative is parsed and rejected. Invalid NvPCR
names take the same continue path.
Follow-up for: 85d7fb2247
systemd-escape currently only processes strings passed as
command line arguments. This is awkward for callers that already
have a generated list of strings, because they need to loop around
the tool or use xargs and carefully preserve whitespace and other
special characters.
Add --stdin to read one string per line from standard input and
write one escaped result per output line. Keep command line strings
mutually exclusive with --stdin so the input source remains
unambiguous.
Use an explicit option instead of treating '-' specially, since '-'
is itself a valid string to escape. The existing escape, unescape,
mangle, path, suffix, and template rules are reused unchanged.
unit_file_find_dirs() is called once for every (unit name or alias,
lookup directory, drop-in suffix) combination while enumerating units
at boot, to check whether that unit has a ".d", ".wants", ".requires"
or ".upholds" drop-in directory in that particular lookup path. On a
typical system with ~270 loaded units and ~12 directories in the unit
search path, this adds up to tens of thousands of calls.
For every one of those calls, the function used to independently
re-derive the full chain of candidate unit names to check for that one
directory: the name itself, its template if it is a template instance,
and its "-" prefix chain (e.g. for "foo-bar-waldo.service" also
"foo-bar-.service" and "foo-.service"), recursively expanding further
where applicable. That derivation only depends on the unit name itself
and does not involve the lookup directory at all, so it produces the
exact same list of candidate names regardless of which of the 12
lookup directories is currently being checked. Despite this, it was
being fully recomputed for every single directory, doing several small
allocations and unit-name parsing calls (unit_name_template(),
unit_name_to_prefix(), unit_name_build_from_type(), ...) each time.
Split the name-derivation logic out into its own function,
unit_file_expand_dropin_names(), and compute it once per unit
name/alias, then reuse the resulting candidate list across all lookup
directories instead of re-deriving it for each of them. The order in
which candidate directories end up being added is unchanged, so this
is not expected to alter drop-in resolution behaviour: I confirmed this
by comparing the sorted unit load state, fragment path and drop-in path
output of "systemd --test --system" before and after this change on the
same unit tree, which is byte-for-byte identical.
I measured the effect by instrumenting manager_enumerate() with
CLOCK_MONOTONIC timestamps and running systemd, built from this exact
tree, as actual PID 1 in a container with ~270 real units loaded, 50
runs each before and after this change:
before: mean 45.35ms (stddev 0.60ms)
after: mean 38.81ms (stddev 0.81ms)
a ~14% reduction with about 8 standard deviations of separation between
the two distributions, i.e. well outside of run-to-run noise.
unit_file_expand_dropin_names()'s out parameter is renamed from
ret_names to names, since it is appended to (including recursively)
rather than only being populated on success, matching the ret_ naming
convention used elsewhere for output-only parameters. Also, a failure
partway through expanding a name's candidates (e.g. OOM) no longer
discards the candidates already derived before the failure, keeping
unit_file_find_dirs() closer to the original recursive
implementation's error handling.
unit_file_add_dir_if_exists(), which builds the path to check for each
(lookup directory, candidate name) pair, is now the hottest remaining
part of this code: with the per-directory re-derivation gone, it is
called once for every directory/candidate combination instead of once
per candidate. It used to build that path with strjoin(name, suffix)
followed by path_join(unit_path, name_and_suffix), i.e. two heap
allocations plus path_join()'s normalization pass. Lookup paths are
already normalized (path_simplify() + strv_uniq()), so a single
strjoin(unit_path, "/", name, suffix) produces the same string while
halving the allocations and skipping the redundant normalization.
The message, icon and id fields are written verbatim into single-line
assignments of the [Ask] section of the agent request file, so a newline in
them lets the caller append arbitrary further assignments. Agents let a later
assignment override an earlier one, so an injected Socket= line redirects the
password to a path of the injector's choosing. Validate the fields and refuse
the request instead.
