jeffhuang 4089f60df5 pe-binary: bound section data against file size, cap UKI zero-padding hash, validate optional header size
A hostile but structurally valid 382-byte PE32+ "EFI application" with a
single section whose VirtualSize is ~4 GiB and SizeOfRawData is 0 drives
uki_hash() into ~4.17 M iterations of SHA-256 over 1024 bytes of zeros
— wedging the parser for >10 s. Nine more slow-units share the same
shape. A separate MSAN finding from the new fuzzer (CIFuzz, memory
sanitizer) shows pe_load_headers() reading uninitialised heap memory
when SizeOfOptionalHeader is too small to actually contain
NumberOfRvaAndSizes.

Three tightenings in src/shared/pe-binary.c:

  1. In pe_load_sections, reject sections whose PointerToRawData +
     SizeOfRawData exceeds the actual file size. Raw section data must
     fit inside the file; this is the parser-wide invariant
     pe_hash / uki_hash / pe_read_section_data rely on.

  2. In uki_hash, cap the (VirtualSize - SizeOfRawData) zero-padding
     hash loop at 64 MiB. Real UKIs do not pad sections with tens of
     MiB of zero-equivalent data; anything above this cap is a
     malformed PE.

  3. In pe_load_headers, reject a PE whose SizeOfOptionalHeader is too
     small to cover up to NumberOfRvaAndSizes. Without this guard the
     subsequent size-mismatch check reads uninitialised optional-header
     bytes, caught by MSAN under CIFuzz.

Add the 382 B canonical reproducer (plus two structural siblings) and
the MSAN reproducer to test/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary/. Also add a libFuzzer
harness in src/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary.c and unit tests in
src/test/test-pe-binary.c that exercise each fix branch in isolation.
The 64 MiB hash boundary test is gated behind SYSTEMD_SLOW_TESTS so it
doesn't slow down emulated-arch CI.

This is a robustness fix, not a security fix: PE binaries consumed by
bootctl / systemd-stub / pcrlock / kernel-install / systemd-measure are
already trusted and signed at the consumer side, so the worst pre-fix
behaviour is wasted CPU on a UKI install / measure / inspect call.

Closes #42344.

Reported-by: AI-assisted libFuzzer campaign
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0c5cba6420)
(cherry picked from commit 6b0830b25c)
2026-06-26 14:52:28 +01:00
2026-05-27 12:20:29 +01:00
2025-10-07 13:00:12 +01:00
2025-03-07 17:27:20 +01:00
2026-05-27 12:20:18 +01:00
2025-06-05 14:39:20 +02:00
2025-10-07 13:00:12 +01:00
2026-05-27 14:18:33 +01:00
2025-07-10 18:09:17 +02:00

Systemd

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