cryptsetup: measure via the pcrextend varlink service

Measure the volume key and unlock keyslot through io.systemd.PCRExtend
instead of driving the TPM directly via tpm2-util, matching how the
verity and imds measurements already work.

Bank selection and the TPM context now live entirely in
systemd-pcrextend. As a result the tpm2-measure-bank= crypttab option
can no longer be honored per volume and is now a deprecated no-op.

Signed-off-by: Paul Meyer <katexochen0@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Paul Meyer
2026-07-22 08:28:53 +02:00
parent 1812d8792f
commit 1bdf2db6f7
6 changed files with 138 additions and 101 deletions

6
NEWS
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@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ CHANGES WITH 262:
older systemd versions, however systemd continues to accept TPM-sealed
credentials that were created before this change.
* The "tpm2-measure-bank=" crypttab option of systemd-cryptsetup is
now deprecated and has no effect. Volume key measurements are
performed via varlink call to systemd-pcrextend, which automatically
selects all suitable TPM2 PCR banks; the banks can no longer be
restricted per volume.
* The legacy socket for controlling systemd-udevd has been removed, and
udevadm now unconditionally uses Varlink IPC. The legacy UNIX socket
/run/udev/control, which is sometimes used to check whether udevd is

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@@ -939,11 +939,8 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><option>tpm2-measure-bank=</option></term>
<listitem><para>Selects one or more TPM2 PCR banks to measure the volume key into, as configured with
<option>tpm2-measure-pcr=</option> above. Multiple banks may be specified, separated by a colon
character. If not specified, automatically determines available and used banks. Expects a message
digest name (e.g. <literal>sha1</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>, …) as argument, to identify the
bank.</para>
<listitem><para>This option is deprecated and has no effect since version 262. All suitable PCR
banks are used.</para>
<xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v253"/></listitem>
</varlistentry>

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@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@
#include "sd-device.h"
#include "sd-event.h"
#include "sd-json.h"
#include "sd-messages.h"
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "ask-password-api.h"
#include "build.h"
#include "crypto-util.h"
#include "cryptsetup-fido2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
@@ -40,6 +38,7 @@
#include "options.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "pcrextend-util.h"
#include "pkcs11-util.h"
#include "pretty-print.h"
#include "process-util.h"
@@ -123,7 +122,6 @@ static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false;
static char *arg_tpm2_pcrlock = NULL;
static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC;
static unsigned arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = UINT_MAX; /* This and the following field is about measuring the unlocked volume key to the local TPM */
static char **arg_tpm2_measure_banks = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = NULL;
static char *arg_link_keyring = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_type = NULL;
@@ -140,7 +138,6 @@ STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_banks, strv_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_keyring, freep);
@@ -537,30 +534,9 @@ static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-bank="))) {
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
r = dlopen_libcrypto(LOG_ERR);
if (r < 0)
return r;
l = strv_split(val, ":");
if (!l)
return log_oom();
STRV_FOREACH(i, l) {
const EVP_MD *implementation;
implementation = sym_EVP_get_digestbyname(*i);
if (!implementation)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown bank '%s', refusing.", val);
if (strv_extend(&arg_tpm2_measure_banks, sym_EVP_MD_get0_name(implementation)) < 0)
return log_oom();
}
#else
log_error("Build lacks OpenSSL support, cannot measure to PCR banks, ignoring: %s", option);
#endif
/* Deprecated: the PCR banks to measure into are now chosen by systemd-pcrextend
* (it extends all suitable banks). Kept for compatibility, but ignored. */
log_warning("The tpm2-measure-bank= option is deprecated and has no effect, ignoring.");
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-keyslot-nvpcr="))) {
@@ -1041,57 +1017,21 @@ static int measure_volume_key(
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_TPM2
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
if (strv_isempty(arg_tpm2_measure_banks)) {
r = tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(c, UINT32_C(1) << arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &l);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m");
}
_cleanup_free_ char *joined = strv_join(l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, ", ");
if (!joined)
return log_oom();
/* Note: we don't directly measure the volume key, it might be a security problem to send an
* unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead
* send a HMAC signature instead. */
_cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
/* Note: what is extended to the SHA256 bank here must match the expected hash of 'fixate-volume-key='
* calculated by cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(). */
r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_prefix(cd, name, &prefix);
if (r)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m");
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get volume key prefix: %m");
r = tpm2_pcr_extend_bytes(
c,
/* banks= */ l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks,
/* pcr_index = */ arg_tpm2_measure_pcr,
/* data = */ &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(prefix),
/* secret = */ &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size),
/* event_type = */ TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY,
/* description = */ prefix);
/* Pass the volume key as HMAC secret. pcrextend extends HMAC(volume_key, prefix),
* never a bare hash. Matches cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(). */
r = pcrextend_pcr_now(arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, prefix, &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size), "volume_key");
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend PCR: %m");
log_struct(LOG_INFO,
LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR),
LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, prefix, joined),
LOG_ITEM("MEASURING=%s", prefix),
LOG_ITEM("PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr),
LOG_ITEM("BANKS=%s", joined));
return 0;
#else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring volume key.");
#endif
}
static int measure_keyslot(
@@ -1100,9 +1040,8 @@ static int measure_keyslot(
const char *mechanism,
int keyslot) {
#if HAVE_TPM2
int r;
#endif
assert(cd);
assert(name);
@@ -1111,7 +1050,6 @@ static int measure_keyslot(
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_TPM2
r = efi_measured_os(LOG_WARNING);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -1120,11 +1058,6 @@ static int measure_keyslot(
return 0;
}
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */
if (!escaped)
@@ -1139,27 +1072,11 @@ static int measure_keyslot(
if (!s)
return log_oom();
r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(
c,
/* session= */ NULL,
arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr,
&IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s),
/* secret= */ NULL,
TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT,
s);
r = pcrextend_nvpcr_now(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, s, "keyslot");
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend NvPCR: %m");
log_struct(LOG_INFO,
"MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TPM_NVPCR_EXTEND_STR,
LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended NvPCR index '%s' with '%s'.", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, s),
"MEASURING=%s", s,
"NVPCR=%s", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr);
return 0;
#else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring keyslot.");
#endif
}
static int log_external_activation(int r, const char *volume) {

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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "tpm2-pcr.h"
#include "user-record.h"
static int pcrextend_pcr_now(unsigned pcr, const char *word, const struct iovec *secret, const char *event) {
int pcrextend_pcr_now(unsigned pcr, const char *word, const struct iovec *secret, const char *event) {
#if HAVE_TPM2
int r;
@@ -78,11 +78,14 @@ static int pcrextend_pcr_now(unsigned pcr, const char *word, const struct iovec
#endif
}
static int pcrextend_nvpcr_now(const char *nvpcr, const char *word, const char *event) {
int pcrextend_nvpcr_now(const char *nvpcr, const char *word, const char *event) {
#if HAVE_TPM2
int r;
assert(nvpcr);
assert(word);
_cleanup_(sd_varlink_unrefp) sd_varlink *vl = NULL;
r = sd_varlink_connect_address(&vl, "/run/systemd/io.systemd.PCRExtend");
if (r < 0)

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@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
#include "forward.h"
int pcrextend_pcr_now(unsigned pcr, const char *word, const struct iovec *secret, const char *event);
int pcrextend_nvpcr_now(const char *nvpcr, const char *word, const char *event);
int pcrextend_file_system_word(const char *path, char **ret, char **ret_normalized_path);
int pcrextend_machine_id_word(char **ret);
int pcrextend_product_id_word(char **ret);

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@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
set -eux
set -o pipefail
# Tests that systemd-cryptsetup's tpm2-measure-pcr= option measures the volume key
# through the io.systemd.PCRExtend Varlink service.
#
# Note: the tpm2-measure-keyslot-nvpcr= (NvPCR) path is intentionally not covered here. NvPCRs use a
# signed PCR policy that must be anchored first (see TEST-70-TPM2.nvpcr.sh), which is heavy setup
# orthogonal to what this test checks; the NvPCR extend-via-pcrextend path is already covered there.
# shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh
. "$(dirname "$0")"/util.sh
export SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug
if ! command -v systemd-cryptsetup >/dev/null || ! tpm_has_pcr sha256 15; then
echo "systemd-cryptsetup or PCR 15 (sha256) not available, skipping cryptsetup measurement test"
exit 0
fi
IMAGE=""
at_exit() {
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
# Dump the event log on failure, to ease debugging
jq --seq --slurp </run/log/systemd/tpm2-measure.log || :
fi
set +e
systemd-cryptsetup detach test-volume
rm -rf /run/systemd/system/systemd-pcrextend.socket.d
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl restart systemd-pcrextend.socket
rm -f "${IMAGE:-}" /tmp/passphrase /tmp/vk /tmp/vk-hmac.bin \
/tmp/oldpcr15 /tmp/newpcr15 /tmp/measure-bank.log
}
trap at_exit EXIT
# The socket carries ConditionSecurity=measured-os, which does not hold in the
# test VM, so the Varlink service would never activate. Drop the condition so
# systemd-cryptsetup can reach it, exactly like TEST-70-TPM2.pcrextend.sh does.
mkdir -p /run/systemd/system/systemd-pcrextend.socket.d
cat >/run/systemd/system/systemd-pcrextend.socket.d/50-no-condition.conf <<EOF
[Unit]
ConditionSecurity=
EOF
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl restart systemd-pcrextend.socket
# Prepare a fresh LUKS2 volume unlocked by a passphrase keyfile
IMAGE="$(mktemp /tmp/systemd-cryptsetup-measure-XXX.IMAGE)"
truncate -s 20M "$IMAGE"
echo -n passphrase >/tmp/passphrase
chmod 0600 /tmp/passphrase
cryptsetup luksFormat -q --pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000 --use-urandom "$IMAGE" /tmp/passphrase
UUID="$(cryptsetup luksUUID "$IMAGE")"
# Extract the raw volume key so we can recompute the expected HMAC below. The
# volume key is measured as HMAC(volume_key, prefix) rather than a plain hash
# (see cryptsetup_get_volume_key_prefix()/cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id()).
cryptsetup luksDump -q --dump-volume-key --volume-key-file=/tmp/vk --key-file=/tmp/passphrase "$IMAGE"
VK_HEX="$(od -An -v -tx1 /tmp/vk | tr -d ' \n')"
# prefix = "cryptsetup:" <escaped volume name> ":" <LUKS UUID>; "test-volume"
# contains no ':' so it is unescaped.
PREFIX="cryptsetup:test-volume:$UUID"
# Expected measured digest for the sha256 bank: HMAC-SHA256(volume_key, prefix)
printf '%s' "$PREFIX" | openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:$VK_HEX" >/tmp/vk-hmac.bin
DIGEST_EXPECTED="$(od -An -v -tx1 /tmp/vk-hmac.bin | tr -d ' \n')"
# Remember the current event log length so we can index the record we add.
# (json-seq: each record is RS(0x1e)-prefixed, LF-suffixed.) The log is created
# lazily on the first measurement, and this subtest may be the first thing to
# measure (e.g. when run in isolation), so treat an absent log as zero records.
RECORD_COUNT=0
if [[ -f /run/log/systemd/tpm2-measure.log ]]; then
RECORD_COUNT="$(jq --seq --slurp '. | length' </run/log/systemd/tpm2-measure.log | tr -d '\036')"
fi
tpm2_pcrread sha256:15 -Q -o /tmp/oldpcr15
# Activate with measurement enabled. Unlock is via the keyfile (no TPM unlock),
# to prove measurement is independent of the unlock mechanism.
SYSTEMD_FORCE_MEASURE=1 systemd-cryptsetup attach test-volume "$IMAGE" /tmp/passphrase \
tpm2-measure-pcr=15,headless=1
tpm2_pcrread sha256:15 -Q -o /tmp/newpcr15
# The TPM PCR 15 must have been extended with the HMAC:
# new = sha256(old || HMAC(volume_key, prefix))
diff /tmp/newpcr15 \
<(cat /tmp/oldpcr15 /tmp/vk-hmac.bin | openssl dgst -binary -sha256)
# The volume-key measurement is the record we just added (the first one past RECORD_COUNT).
test "$(jq --seq --slurp ".[$RECORD_COUNT].pcr" </run/log/systemd/tpm2-measure.log)" == "$(printf '\x1e15')"
DIGEST_CURRENT="$(jq --seq --slurp --raw-output ".[$RECORD_COUNT].digests[] | select(.hashAlg == \"sha256\").digest" </run/log/systemd/tpm2-measure.log)"
test "$DIGEST_CURRENT" == "$DIGEST_EXPECTED"
systemd-cryptsetup detach test-volume
# The deprecated tpm2-measure-bank= option must warn but not fail.
SYSTEMD_FORCE_MEASURE=1 systemd-cryptsetup attach test-volume "$IMAGE" /tmp/passphrase \
tpm2-measure-pcr=15,tpm2-measure-bank=sha256,headless=1 |& tee /tmp/measure-bank.log
systemd-cryptsetup detach test-volume
grep -i "deprecated" /tmp/measure-bank.log >/dev/null