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cryptenroll: harden some variables with erasure on cleanup

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This doesn't really matter as it runs in user contexts, but
follow good practice and mark all variables containing secrets
for erasure on cleanup

Reported on yeswehack.com as YWH-PGM9780-170

(cherry picked from commit 07167cefd6)
This commit is contained in:
Luca Boccassi
2026-03-27 23:45:20 +00:00
parent cb6fdfc407
commit 190d2fcfb4
1 changed files with 12 additions and 9 deletions
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21
src/shared/tpm2-util.c
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@@ -4923,7 +4923,7 @@ static int tpm2_kdfa(
if (!hash_alg_name)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *buf = NULL;
r = kdf_kb_hmac_derive(
"COUNTER",
hash_alg_name,
@@ -5001,7 +5001,7 @@ static int tpm2_kdfe(
/* assert we copied exactly the right amount that we allocated */
assert(end > info && (uintptr_t) end - (uintptr_t) info == info_len);
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *buf = NULL;
r = kdf_ss_derive(
hash_alg_name,
shared_secret,
@@ -5088,7 +5088,7 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_private(
log_debug("Calculating private part of sealed object.");
_cleanup_free_ void *storage_key = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *storage_key = NULL;
size_t storage_key_size;
r = tpm2_kdfa(parent->publicArea.nameAlg,
seed->buffer,
@@ -5108,7 +5108,7 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_private(
size_t bits = (size_t) r * 8;
_cleanup_free_ void *integrity_key = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *integrity_key = NULL;
size_t integrity_key_size;
r = tpm2_kdfa(parent->publicArea.nameAlg,
seed->buffer,
@@ -5123,6 +5123,7 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_private(
return log_debug_errno(r, "Could not calculate integrity key KDFa: %m");
TPM2B_AUTH auth = {};
CLEANUP_ERASE(auth);
if (pin) {
r = tpm2_auth_value_from_pin(parent->publicArea.nameAlg, pin, &auth);
if (r < 0)
@@ -5138,8 +5139,9 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_private(
.sensitive.bits = TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA_MAKE(secret, secret_size),
},
};
CLEANUP_ERASE(sensitive);
_cleanup_free_ void *marshalled_sensitive = malloc(sizeof(sensitive));
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *marshalled_sensitive = malloc(sizeof(sensitive));
if (!marshalled_sensitive)
return log_oom_debug();
@@ -5246,7 +5248,7 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_rsa_seed(
size_t seed_size = (size_t) r;
_cleanup_free_ void *seed = malloc(seed_size);
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *seed = malloc(seed_size);
if (!seed)
return log_oom_debug();
@@ -5316,7 +5318,7 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_ecc_seed(
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_free_ void *shared_secret = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *shared_secret = NULL;
size_t shared_secret_size;
r = ecc_ecdh(pkey, parent_pkey, &shared_secret, &shared_secret_size);
if (r < 0)
@@ -5357,7 +5359,7 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_ecc_seed(
size_t bits = (size_t) r * 8;
_cleanup_free_ void *seed = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *seed = NULL;
size_t seed_size = 0; /* Explicit initialization to appease gcc */
r = tpm2_kdfe(parent->publicArea.nameAlg,
shared_secret,
@@ -5394,7 +5396,8 @@ static int tpm2_calculate_seal_seed(
log_debug("Calculating encrypted seed for sealed object.");
_cleanup_free_ void *seed = NULL, *encrypted_seed = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *seed = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *encrypted_seed = NULL;
size_t seed_size = 0, encrypted_seed_size = 0; /* Explicit initialization to appease gcc */
if (parent->publicArea.type == TPM2_ALG_RSA)
r = tpm2_calculate_seal_rsa_seed(parent, &seed, &seed_size, &encrypted_seed, &encrypted_seed_size);