Files
hermes-agent/plugins/dashboard_auth/basic/__init__.py
T
unsupportedpastels 074d150fab fix(dashboard-auth): print the ignored basic-auth secret notice once on stderr
The error for a signing secret holding shell text only reached agent.log and
errors.log, so an operator watching the console of hermes serve or hermes
dashboard saw nothing and was only signed out on every restart. Print one line
on stderr the first time such a secret is ignored in a process. The line names
the setting and the fix but never the configured value.
2026-10-27 16:37:10 -04:00

296 lines
14 KiB
Python

"""BasicAuthProvider — username/password dashboard auth (no OAuth IDP).
Login is a credential form (``supports_password`` + ``complete_password_login``); cookies,
verify, refresh, ws-tickets and logout are the shared framework. Sessions are stateless
HMAC-signed tokens (no IDP, no database); passwords use stdlib scrypt and login always hashes
even for an unknown username (no username-enumeration timing oracle). Config: ``dashboard.
basic_auth.{username,password_hash|password,secret,session_ttl_seconds}`` or the
``HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_*`` env vars (env wins when non-empty; see ``_settings``).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import os
import secrets
import sys
import time
from typing import Optional
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import DashboardAuthProvider, InvalidCredentialsError, RefreshExpiredError, Session
from plugins.dashboard_auth._shared import (
NonInteractiveMixin, SkipRegistration, load_config_section, register_provider, resolve_env_or_cfg)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_TAG = "dashboard-auth-basic"
# The middleware transparently refreshes via the 30-day refresh token when the
# access token lapses, so the TTL controls refresh frequency, not login length.
_DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 12 * 60 * 60
_REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60
# Interactive-login scrypt parameters (~16 MiB, a few ms); n must be a power of two.
_SCRYPT_N = 2**14
_SCRYPT_R = 8
_SCRYPT_P = 1
_SCRYPT_DKLEN = 32
_SCRYPT_SALT_BYTES = 16
# HMAC-SHA256 digest is appended to signed tokens as a fixed-length suffix
# (no separator — binary HMAC bytes can't be confused with a delimiter).
_SIG_LEN = hashlib.sha256().digest_size
LAST_SKIP_REASON: str = ""
# ---- Password hashing (stdlib scrypt) ----
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
"""Return a ``scrypt$n$r$p$<salt_b64>$<dk_b64>`` hash string. Public so operators can
precompute ``password_hash`` for config.yaml (the plaintext then never sits at rest):
``python -c "from plugins.dashboard_auth.basic import hash_password; print(hash_password('pw'))"``."""
salt = secrets.token_bytes(_SCRYPT_SALT_BYTES)
dk = hashlib.scrypt(
password.encode("utf-8"), salt=salt, n=_SCRYPT_N, r=_SCRYPT_R, p=_SCRYPT_P, dklen=_SCRYPT_DKLEN, maxmem=0)
salt_b64, dk_b64 = base64.b64encode(salt).decode(), base64.b64encode(dk).decode()
return f"scrypt${_SCRYPT_N}${_SCRYPT_R}${_SCRYPT_P}${salt_b64}${dk_b64}"
def _verify_password(password: str, encoded: str) -> bool:
"""Constant-time scrypt verify. False on any malformed hash string."""
try:
scheme, n_s, r_s, p_s, salt_b64, dk_b64 = encoded.split("$")
if scheme != "scrypt":
return False
n, r, p = int(n_s), int(r_s), int(p_s)
salt = base64.b64decode(salt_b64)
expected = base64.b64decode(dk_b64)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
try:
actual = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode("utf-8"), salt=salt, n=n, r=r, p=p, dklen=len(expected), maxmem=0)
except (ValueError, MemoryError):
return False
return hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected)
# Verified against when the username is unknown so "no such user" and "wrong
# password" take comparable time.
_DUMMY_HASH = hash_password("dummy-password-for-constant-time-verify")
# ---- Token signing (stateless HMAC-signed blobs) ----
def _sign(payload: dict, secret: bytes) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
sig = hmac.new(secret, raw, hashlib.sha256).digest()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw + sig).decode()
def _unsign(token: str, secret: bytes, kind: str) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Return the payload if the signature is valid, ``kind`` matches and it
is unexpired; ``None`` otherwise (including on any decode error)."""
try:
blob = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.encode())
if len(blob) <= _SIG_LEN:
return None
raw, sig = blob[:-_SIG_LEN], blob[-_SIG_LEN:]
expected = hmac.new(secret, raw, hashlib.sha256).digest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected):
return None
payload = json.loads(raw)
except Exception:
return None
if payload.get("kind") != kind or payload.get("exp", 0) <= int(time.time()):
return None
return payload
# ---- Provider ----
class BasicAuthProvider(NonInteractiveMixin, DashboardAuthProvider):
"""Username/password provider with stateless HMAC-signed sessions."""
name = "basic"
display_name = "Username & Password"
supports_password = True
_NOT_INTERACTIVE = "BasicAuthProvider is password-only; use complete_password_login."
_NO_START_LOGIN = (
"BasicAuthProvider is password-only; there is no OAuth redirect flow. "
"The login page POSTs to /auth/password-login instead.")
def __init__(self, *, username: str, password_hash: str, secret: bytes, ttl_seconds: int = _DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS) -> None:
if not username:
raise ValueError("username must be non-empty")
if not password_hash:
raise ValueError("password_hash must be non-empty")
if len(secret) < 16:
raise ValueError("secret must be at least 16 bytes")
self._username = username
self._password_hash = password_hash
self._secret = secret
self._ttl = max(60, int(ttl_seconds))
# ---- password login ----------------------------------------------------
def complete_password_login(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> Session:
# Always run a scrypt verify (real hash if the username matches, else the dummy)
# and compare the username with compare_digest too, so neither the username nor
# its length leaks via timing.
username_ok = hmac.compare_digest(username.encode("utf-8"), self._username.encode("utf-8"))
password_ok = _verify_password(password, self._password_hash if username_ok else _DUMMY_HASH)
if not (username_ok and password_ok):
raise InvalidCredentialsError("invalid username or password")
return self._mint_session(self._username)
# ---- session lifecycle -------------------------------------------------
def verify_session(self, *, access_token: str) -> Optional[Session]:
payload = _unsign(access_token, self._secret, "access")
if payload is None:
return None
return self._session(str(payload.get("sub", "")), int(payload["exp"]), access_token, "")
def refresh_session(self, *, refresh_token: str) -> Session:
if not refresh_token:
raise RefreshExpiredError("no refresh token present in session")
payload = _unsign(refresh_token, self._secret, "refresh")
if payload is None:
raise RefreshExpiredError("refresh token expired or invalid")
return self._mint_session(str(payload.get("sub", self._username)))
def revoke_session(self, *, refresh_token: str) -> None:
# Stateless tokens — nothing to revoke server-side; the session expires within its TTL. Must not raise.
return None
# ---- internals ---------------------------------------------------------
def _mint_session(self, user_id: str) -> Session:
# ``jti`` gives every session its own tokens, even two minted in one second: a listener that
# drops a session's tokens (the Webapp's sign-out) must not get them back from a later login.
now = int(time.time())
exp = now + self._ttl
jti = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
return self._session(
user_id, exp,
_sign({"sub": user_id, "kind": "access", "exp": exp, "jti": jti}, self._secret),
_sign({"sub": user_id, "kind": "refresh", "exp": now + _REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS, "jti": jti}, self._secret))
def _session(self, user_id: str, exp: int, access_token: str, refresh_token: str) -> Session:
return Session(
user_id=user_id, email="", display_name=user_id, org_id="", provider=self.name,
expires_at=exp, access_token=access_token, refresh_token=refresh_token)
# ---- Plugin entry point ----
def _load_config_basic_auth_section() -> dict:
return load_config_section(logger, _TAG, "dashboard", "basic_auth")
# Shell syntax that was written to .env/config without being run, e.g. a
# ``$(openssl rand -base64 32)`` line inside a quoted heredoc, or the command (or a doc
# placeholder naming it) pasted in place of its output. Base64 and hex never contain
# these (nor a space), and everyone who copied the same line would share the same key.
_UNEXPANDED_SHELL_MARKERS = ("$(", "`", "openssl rand")
# The error above only reaches the log files, not the console of ``hermes serve`` /
# ``hermes dashboard``; one stderr line per process makes it visible there too.
_shell_text_secret_reported = False
def _resolve_secret(cfg_section: dict) -> bytes:
"""Resolve the token-signing secret (base64, hex, or raw text). When unset, generates
a random per-process secret (sessions then don't survive a restart or span multiple
workers — logged at INFO). A value holding unexpanded shell text is never used as the
key: it is logged as an error and replaced by a random per-process secret."""
raw = resolve_env_or_cfg("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET", cfg_section.get("secret"))
if not raw:
logger.info(
"dashboard-auth-basic: no 'secret' configured; generating a random "
"per-process signing key. Sessions will not survive a restart or span "
"multiple workers. Set dashboard.basic_auth.secret (or "
"HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET) for stable sessions.")
return secrets.token_bytes(32)
if any(marker in raw for marker in _UNEXPANDED_SHELL_MARKERS):
logger.error(
"dashboard-auth-basic: the configured signing secret contains unexpanded shell "
"text (such as '$(openssl rand -base64 32)') instead of a random value, so it "
"is ignored and a random per-process signing key is used. Set "
"HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET (or dashboard.basic_auth.secret) to the "
"output of 'openssl rand -base64 32' to keep sessions across restarts.")
global _shell_text_secret_reported
if not _shell_text_secret_reported:
_shell_text_secret_reported = True
print(
"hermes: dashboard login: HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET (or "
"dashboard.basic_auth.secret) holds shell text instead of a random value; "
"using a per-process key, so sessions end on restart. Replace it with the "
"output of: openssl rand -base64 32", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
return secrets.token_bytes(32)
for decoder in (base64.b64decode, bytes.fromhex):
try:
decoded = decoder(raw)
if len(decoded) >= 16:
return decoded
except (ValueError, TypeError):
pass
return raw.encode("utf-8")
def _settings() -> dict:
"""Resolve BasicAuthProvider kwargs from env/config; raises ``SkipRegistration``."""
section = _load_config_basic_auth_section()
def setting(env_name: str, cfg_key: str) -> str:
return resolve_env_or_cfg(env_name, section.get(cfg_key, ""))
username = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_USERNAME", "username")
password_hash = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH", "password_hash")
plaintext = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD", "password")
ttl_raw = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_TTL_SECONDS", "session_ttl_seconds")
if not username:
raise SkipRegistration(
"dashboard.basic_auth.username is not set (and HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_USERNAME "
"is empty). Set a username and a password (or password_hash) under "
"dashboard.basic_auth in config.yaml to enable username/password dashboard "
"login, or use the OAuth provider, or pass --insecure to skip the auth gate.")
if not password_hash and not plaintext:
raise SkipRegistration(
"dashboard.basic_auth.username is set but neither password_hash nor password "
"is configured. Provide one of them (password_hash is preferred — compute it "
"with plugins.dashboard_auth.basic.hash_password).",
level="warning")
# Precedence: env password (hashed in-memory) overrides any config password_hash so
# operators can rotate without editing config; a config password_hash wins over a
# config-only plaintext password (preferred at-rest form).
plaintext_from_env = os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD", "").strip()
if plaintext_from_env:
password_hash = hash_password(plaintext_from_env)
logger.info("dashboard-auth-basic: hashed env-supplied password in-memory (overrides any config password_hash).")
elif not password_hash:
password_hash = hash_password(plaintext)
logger.info(
"dashboard-auth-basic: hashed plaintext password in-memory. "
"For production, precompute dashboard.basic_auth.password_hash "
"and remove the plaintext password from config.")
try:
ttl = int(ttl_raw) if ttl_raw else _DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS
except ValueError:
ttl = _DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS
return {"username": username, "password_hash": password_hash, "secret": _resolve_secret(section), "ttl_seconds": ttl}
def register(ctx) -> None:
"""Register ``BasicAuthProvider`` when username + (password or
password_hash) are configured; a no-op for OAuth / ``--insecure`` setups."""
global LAST_SKIP_REASON
LAST_SKIP_REASON = ""
kwargs, LAST_SKIP_REASON = register_provider(ctx, logger, _TAG, BasicAuthProvider, _settings)
if kwargs is not None:
logger.info("dashboard-auth-basic: registered password provider (username=%s)", kwargs["username"])