Files
openssh-portable/auth2-hostbased.c
T
djm@openbsd.org 65666f4e82 upstream: Check key and CA sig type during key parsing
Checks key type and CA signature algorithm allowlists as early as
possible during public key deserialisation.

Use this in the client and server to reduce attack surface from
disallowed key/signature types.

With Chris Rohlf in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research

ok markus, deraadt

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b03cb3755506231a742eed844f269524812f560a
2026-09-16 10:56:51 +10:00

277 lines
8.6 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.59 2026/09/16 00:31:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_hostbased;
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL, *b = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
u_char *sig;
size_t alen, slen;
int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &keyblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
debug_f("cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu",
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr);
#endif
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg,
options.hostbased_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in "
"HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(keyblob)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
switch ((r = sshkey_fromb_allowlist(b, &key,
options.hostbased_accepted_algos, options.ca_sign_algorithms))) {
case 0:
/* ok */
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_ALG_UNSUPPORTED:
/* This shouldn't happen unless the client is being weird */
logit_f("key algorithm differs from signature algorithm %s and "
"is not in HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg);
goto done;
case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED:
logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm not in "
"CASignatureAlgorithms");
goto done;
default:
error_fr(r, "parse key");
goto done;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
b = NULL;
if (key->type != pktype || (sshkey_type_plain(pktype) == KEY_ECDSA &&
sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(pkalg) != key->ecdsa_nid)) {
error_f("key type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %s, expected %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(key), pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
goto done;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* reconstruct packet */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, keyblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet");
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
chost, key) &&
mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
done:
debug2_f("authenticated %d", authenticated);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
free(pkalg);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
char *fp;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
debug2_f("chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
chost[len - 1] = '\0';
}
if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused user \"%.100s\" "
"host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", cuser, chost);
return 0;
}
lookup = chost;
} else {
if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
"client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused "
"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
return 0;
}
lookup = resolvedname;
}
debug2_f("access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_cert_check_host(key, lookup,
options.ca_sign_algorithms, &reason) != 0) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
error("Refusing certificate ID \"%s\" serial=%llu signed by "
"%s CA %s: %s", key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, reason);
auth_debug_add("Refused Certificate ID \"%s\" serial=%llu: %s",
key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
reason);
free(fp);
return 0;
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
}
free(fp);
}
return (host_status == HOST_OK);
}
Authmethod method_hostbased = {
&methodcfg_hostbased,
userauth_hostbased,
};