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chore: bump OpenClaw to 2026.5.26
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@@ -18,39 +18,6 @@ Adds policy-backed doctor checks for workspace conformance.
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plugin
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## Behavior
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The Policy plugin contributes doctor health checks for policy-managed OpenClaw
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settings and governed workspace declarations. Policy currently covers channel
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conformance, governed tool metadata, MCP server posture, model-provider posture,
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private-network access posture, Gateway exposure posture, agent workspace/tool
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posture, configured global/per-agent tool posture, and OpenClaw config secret
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provider/auth profile posture.
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Policy stores authored requirements in `policy.jsonc`, observes existing
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OpenClaw settings and workspace declarations as evidence, and reports drift
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through `openclaw policy check` and `openclaw doctor --lint`. A clean policy
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check emits policy, evidence, findings, and attestation hashes that operators
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can record for audit.
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Tool posture rules can require approved profiles, workspace-only filesystem
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tools, bounded exec security/ask/host settings, disabled elevated mode, exact
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`alsoAllow` entries, and required tool deny entries. The evidence records
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additive `alsoAllow` entries because they can widen effective tool posture.
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These checks observe config conformance only; they do not read runtime approval
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state or add runtime enforcement.
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Named agent policy scopes under `scopes.<scopeName>` can add stricter
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normal policy sections for the runtime agent ids listed in `agentIds`. The
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initial scoped sections are `tools` and `agents.workspace`; future sections such
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as sandbox or ingress can join the same container after their evidence carries
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agent identity. Every scope present in `policy.jsonc` must be valid and
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enforceable for its selector. Overlay rules are additional claims, so they do
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not weaken top-level policy and can produce their own findings when the same
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observed config violates both scopes. Runtime agent ids that are not explicitly
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listed in `agents.list[]` are checked against inherited global/default posture
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rather than silently passing with no evidence.
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## Related docs
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- [policy](/cli/policy)
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