This package was originally internal, but was moved out when BuildKit
used it for its integration tests. That's no longer the case, so we
can make it internal again.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Move the option-types to the client and in some cases create a
copy for the backend. These types are used to construct query-
args, and not marshaled to JSON, and can be replaced with functional
options in the client.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
We can't add it to the templates, because those are not generated,
so adding it in the code that uses the templates, and prepend the
header before handling the template.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Follow-up to 494677f93f, which added
the aliases, but did not yet replace our own use of the nat types.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The Inter-Network Communication rules in the iptables chains
DOCKER-ISOLATION-STAGE-1 / DOCKER-ISOLATION-STAGE-2 (which are
called from filter-FORWARD) currently:
- Block access from containers in one bridge network, to ports
published to host addresses by containers in other bridge
networks, when the userland-proxy is disabled.
- But, that access is allowed when the proxy is enabled.
- Block access to all ports on container addresses in gateway
mode "nat-unprotected" networks.
- But, those ports can be accessed from anywhere else, including
other hosts. Just not other bridge networks.
- Allow access from containers in "nat" bridge networks to published
ports on container addresses in "routed" networks. But, to do that,
extra INC rules are added for the routed network.
The INC rules are no longer needed to block access from containers
in one network to unpublished ports on container addresses in
other networks. Direct routing to containers in NAT networks is
blocked by the "raw-PREROUTING" rules that block access from
untrusted interfaces (all interfaces apart from the network's
own bridge).
Drop these INC rules to resolve the inconsistencies listed above,
with this change:
- Published ports on host addresses can be accessed from containers
in other networks (even without the userland-proxy).
- The rules for direct routing between bridge networks are the same
as the rules for direct routing from outside the Docker host
(allowed for gw modes "routed" and "nat-unprotected", disallowed
for "nat").
Fewer rules, so it's simpler, and perhaps slightly faster.
Internal networks (with no access to networks outside the host)
are also implemented using rules in the DOCKER-ISOLATION chains.
This change moves those rules to a new chain, DOCKER-INTERNAL,
and drops the DOCKER-ISOLATION chains.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
These comments were added to enforce using the correct import path for
our packages ("github.com/docker/docker", not "github.com/moby/moby").
However, when working in go module mode (not GOPATH / vendor), they have
no effect, so their impact is limited.
Remove these imports in preparation of migrating our code to become an
actual go module.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Commit 27adcd5 ("libnet/d/bridge: drop connections to lo mappings, and
direct remote connections") introduced an iptables rule to drop 'direct'
remote connections made to the container's IP address - for each
published port on the container.
The normal filter-FORWARD rules would then drop packets sent directly to
unpublished ports. This rule was only created along with the rest of port
publishing (when a container's endpoint was selected as its gateway). Until
then, all packets addressed directly to the container's ports were dropped
by the filter-FORWARD rules.
But, the rule doesn't need to be per-port. Just drop packets sent
directly to a container's address unless they originate on the host.
That means fewer rules, that can be created along with the endpoint (then
directly-routed get dropped at the same point whether or not the endpoint
is currently the gateway - very slightly earlier than when it's not the
gateway).
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
The daemon runs in a separate netns, but when it wants to create
an iptables rule it sends a dbus message to firewalld - which is
running in the host's netns.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
A jump to DOCKER-INGRESS chain is only created when Swarm needs
it. That's always after jumps to DOCKER-USER and DOCKER-FORWARD
have been inserted at the top of the FORWARD chain. The
DOCKER-INGRESS rule needs to be between those two other jumps.
Placing the jump to DOCKER-INGRESS at the top of the DOCKER-FORWARD
chain puts it in the right place, without needing to shuffle any
other rules around when it's added.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
Commit 0546d90 introduced the use of ipset to reduce the number
of rules that need to be processed per-packet, and make the code
a bit simpler.
But, docker's used on embedded kernels compiled without support
for ipset, so the change is too disruptive.
Replace the two ipset rules with a new chain that writes out the
rule's actions long-hand. So ..
This rule:
-A FORWARD -m set --match-set docker-ext-bridges-v4 dst \
-m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
Is transformed into a per-bridge rule in new chain DOCKER-CT:
-A DOCKER-FORWARD -j DOCKER-CT
-A DOCKER-CT -o docker0 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A DOCKER-CT -o bridge1 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
And:
-A FORWARD -m set --match-set docker-ext-bridges-v4 dst -j DOCKER
Is transformed into a per-bridge rule in new chain DOCKER-BRIDGE:
-A DOCKER-FORWARD -j DOCKER-BRIDGE
-A DOCKER-BRIDGE -o docker0 -j DOCKER
-A DOCKER-BRIDGE -o bridge1 -j DOCKER
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
In 28.0.0, Docker appended to the FORWARD chain - breaking other
applications that had appended their own rules that needed to execute
after Docker's rules.
Move most of Docker's rules out of the filter-FORWARD chain into a
new DOCKER-FORWARD chain, so that Docker can append to DOCKER-FORWARD
without affecting the order of rules in the FORWARD chain.
After daemon startup inserts jumps to DOCKER-USER and DOCKER-FORWARD,
the bridge driver will not touch the FORWARD chain again. DOCKER-INGRESS
is still added to the FORWARD chain, if used, as it was in 27.x and
earlier.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
Traditionally when Linux receives remote packets with daddr set to a
loopback address, it reject them as 'martians'. However, when a NAT rule
is applied through iptables this doesn't happen. Our current DNAT rule
used to map host ports to containers is applied unconditionally, even
for such 'martian' packets.
This means a neighbor host (ie. a host connected to the same L2
segment) can send packets to a port mapped on a loopback address. The
purpose of publishing on a loopback address is to make ports
inaccessible to remote hosts -- lack of proper filtering defeats that.
This commit adds an iptables rule to the raw-PREROUTING chain to drop
packets with a loopback dest address and coming from any interface other
than lo.
To accomodate WSL2 mirrored mode, another rule is inserted beforehand to
specifically accept packets coming from the loopback0 interface.
Signed-off-by: Albin Kerouanton <albinker@gmail.com>
When a NAT-based port mapping is created, the daemon adds a DNAT rule in
nat-DOCKER to replace the dest addr with the container IP. However, the
daemon never sets up rules to filter packets destined directly to the
container port. This allows a rogue neighbor (ie. a host that shares a
L2 segment with the host) to send packets directly to the container on
its container-side exposed port.
For instance, if container port 5000 is mapped to host port 6000, a
neighbor could send packets directly to the container on its port 5000.
Since nat-DOCKER mangles the dest addr, and the nat table forbids DROP
rules, this change adds a new rule in the raw-PREROUTING chain to filter
ingress connections targeting the container's IP address.
This filtering is only done when gw_mode=nat. For the unprotected
variant, no filtering is done.
Signed-off-by: Albin Kerouanton <albinker@gmail.com>
When a NAT-based port mapping is created with a HostIP specified, we
insert a DNAT rule in nat-DOCKER to replace the dest addr with the
container IP. Then, in filter chains, we allow access to the container
port for any packet not coming from the container's network itself (if
hairpinning is disabled), nor from another host bridge.
However we don't set any rule that prevents a rogue neighbor that shares
a L2 segment with the host, but not the one where the port binding is
expected to be published, from sending packets destined to that HostIP.
For instance, if a port binding is created with HostIP == '127.0.0.1',
this port should not be accessible from anything but the lo interface.
That's currently not the case and this provides a false sense of
security.
Since nat-DOCKER mangles the dest addr, and the nat table rejects DROP
rules, this change adds rules into raw-PREROUTING to filter ingress
packets destined to mapped ports based on the input interface, the dest
addr and the dest port.
Interfaces are dynamically resolved when packets hit the host, thanks
to iptables' addrtype extension. This extension does a fib lookup of the
dest addr and checks that it's associated with the interface reached.
Also, when a proxy-based port mapping is created, as is the case when an
IPv6 HostIP is specified but the container is only IPv4-capable, we
don't set any sort of filtering. So the same issue might happen. The
reason is a bit different - in that case, that's just how the kernel
works. But, in order to stay consistent with NAT-based mappings, these
rules are also applied.
The env var `DOCKER_DISABLE_INPUT_IFACE_FILTERING` can be set to any
true-ish value to globally disable this behavior.
Signed-off-by: Albin Kerouanton <albinker@gmail.com>
Rules no longer need to be rearranged when creating a network.
Per-network rules are always appended to the FORWARD chain so,
after adding them, there's no need to delete the per-driver
rules to re-insert them at the top of the chain.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
Same as "nat" mode, there's masquerading and port mapping from the
host - but no port/protocol filtering for direct access to the
container's address from remote hosts.
This is the old default behaviour for IPv4 when the filter-FORWARD
chain's default policy was "ACCEPT" (the daemon would only set it
to "DROP" when it set sysctl "ip_forward" itself, but it didn't set
up DROP rules for unpublished ports).
Now, port filtering doesn't depend on the filter-FORWARD policy. So,
this mode is added as a way to restore the old/surprising/insecure
behaviour for anyone who's depending on it. Networks will need to
be re-created with this new gateway mode.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
The default for a user-defined chain is RETURN anyway.
This opens up the possibilty of sorting rules into two groups
by using insert or append, without having to deal with appending
after the unconditional RETURN.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
When a container sends a packet to one of its own published ports on the
host, it's normally picked up by the userland proxy and sent back.
When the userland proxy is disabled, a masquerade rule is needed in
order for responses to the container to have the host's source address.
The masquerade rule matches the container's address as source and dest,
and the published port as the dest. It's only used for the no-proxy
case.
So, when the userland proxy is enabled, don't create the masquerade
rule.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
Before this change, for IPv4:
- sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward was enabled during bridge driver
initialisation, if:
- not already enabled
- ip-forward=true, and
- iptables=true.
- the filter-FORWARD chain's policy was set to DROP, if the daemon
updated the sysctl.
- if setting the policy failed, the sysctl change was reverted.
But, for IPv6:
- sysctls net.ipv6.conf.[default|all].forwarding were both enabled
when creating the first IPv6-enabled network, if:
- they weren't already enabled,
- ip-forward=true, and
- ip6tables=true.
- the filter-FORWARD chain's policy was set to DROP when creating
an IPv4 enabled bridge network (inc. the default bridge), if:
- ip6tables=true.
- (this happened whether or not the daemon would ever enable
IPv6 forwarding, or even create an IPv6 network.)
The bridge driver no longer needs the default policy to be DROP to
implement its own port-filtering rules. But, enabling IP forwarding
without setting the filter-FORWARD policy to DROP would potentially
be a security risk.
This change aligns IPv4 and IPv6 behaviours:
- only try to set the sysctls when creating a bridge network that
needs them (for IPv4, that's still during daemon init because
the default bridge is IPv4 enabled).
- only check/set the filter-FORWARD policy after updating sysctls.
- if the filter-FORWARD policy can't be set, treat it as an error
and revert sysctl changes.
We enabled ip6tables by default in 27.0. Setting the filter-FORWARD
policy to DROP even when no IPv6 enabled network was created
caused issues for some users. In particular, those running with
iptables=false suddenly got the IPv6 DROP policy enabled (which
broke unrelated services on the host). This change solves that by
only setting the policy when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
In an integration test - run a daemon, capture iptables, and feed them
to a markdown text/template describing them.
Prep for repeating that, for different network configurations.
Fail the test if the generated markdown differs from a "golden" version.
(So, at-least the golden markdown will need to be updated if the
iptables rules are deliberately changed - hopefully the corresponding
description in the template will also be updated.)
Signed-off-by: Rob Murray <rob.murray@docker.com>
